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ABSTRACT
A resource that Pacific island Countries have in abundant supply is tuna.  The Ocean surrounding 
Island States supply one third of the world’s tuna and between 40 to 50% of raw materials for the 
global canneries. The high concentration of tuna stock in the Western Central Pacific Ocean and the 
depletion of this resource in the other oceans have attracted increased fishing activities in the Region. 
This emanates with high illegally unreported and unregulated fishing activities. Despite formulations 
of fisheries rules to control harvesting of tuna resources, illegal fishing continues to exist. This paper 
examines this problem in the Solomon Islands’ fisheries by addressing three basic questions: (1) 
Why fishers break rules? (2) the circumstances in which fishers break them? and (3) the objective of 
complying with rules.
A qualitative methodological approach using in-depth interviews with former and current fishers of 
various ranks and other key stakeholders was conducted. This included about thirty three personal 
interviews and two focus group interviews.
The study shows most fishers resolved to Illegal Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing activities 
for economic gain. They thrive to maximise their profits which makes deterring such activities 
difficult. The study also reveals that Solomon Islands has weak enforcement and stumpy penalties. 
Additionally, politicians often compromise their decisions in favour of violators. All these factors 
have compounded to the difficulty of countering IUU activities difficult.  Theoretically, ‘The Tragedy 
of the Commons’ by Hardin (Colebatch and Larmour 1993) clearly explains that if fishers continue to 
serve their interest, every fisher will become worse off in the long run. Solomon Islands tuna fisheries 
are lowly moving in that direction if enforcement continues to be weak and fishers are not aware of 
this threat. 
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INTRODUCTION
Tuna is a gigantic and money-spinning industry in the world today. Currently, the major tuna 
markets are the European Union (EU) and the United States of America (USA); however, 
other emerging markets which are evolving fast are Asia, North Africa and the Middle East 
(Globefish, 2012). The high mandate for tuna has increased the total universal aggregate 
procured by approximately 89.97% from 1950 -2002 (Globefish nd). Fishers try and achieve 
this by intensifying their fishing activities, accumulating their fleets and investing in high 
tech equipment. As a consequence, tuna has virtually experienced death/extinction in most 
of the oceans (Public Radio International (PRI) 2013; World Bank 2000). The Pacific Ocean 
nonetheless, is the only ocean that has the world’s remaining stock (Cyranoaski, 2010; Public 
Radio International (PRI), 2013; World Bank, 2000). This has attracted Distance Water Fishing 
Nations 1(DWFNs) such as China, Taiwan, Korea, Japan, the United States of America (USA) 
and the European Union (EU). Most of these nations have entrée to fish in the islands’ 200 miles 
Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) via the acquisition of ‘access fees’ and ‘fishing licenses’. 
Apart from the USA, the other DWFNs fish under the bilateral agreements2 which they have with 
Pacific island countries (PICs). Such negotiations entail allowing the DWFNs to fish in their 
waters, and the stipulated benefits go directly to the coastal States. USA, alternatively signed the 
multilateral agreement3 with the Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA)4, and the benefit from fishing in 
a particular island State goes collectively to all the member countries (World Bank 2000; FFA 
monitoring officer number 1, personal communication, December 26, 2012). Under the ‘U.S.-
Pacific Islands’ tuna fisheries treaty’, the US government grants USD $63 million to Pacific 
Islands’ countries per year for ‘access’ and ‘licenses’ (Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs 
2012).
Despite the establishment of bilateral and multilateral agreements, there are reported proliferations 
when it comes to ‘Pirate fishing’ in the region. This is commonly known as ‘illegally, unreported 
and unregulated (IUU) fishing activities. Illegal fishing activities are committed in various ways. 
The most obvious ones are, fishing without license, fishing on forbidden territories, violation 
of by-catch rules, discards of untargeted species and landing of protected stocks’ (Edeson, 
Freestone & Gudmundsdottir, 2001; Solomon Islands Fisheries’ ACT, 1998; Xepapadea, 2003). 
Unreported activities in contrast, involve under reporting and/or no reporting of the catch. For 
instance, fishers might catch five tonnes of tuna in one set but only record four tonnes (Observer 
number 3, personal communication, December 26, 2012).
Unregulated fishing activities deal with fishers that are not registered under any of the countries 
which have been accepted to fish in FFA member countries. Countries that are permitted to fish 
in FFA member countries are Taiwan, China, Korea, EU and USA. It is a requisite; to register 
should any other country wish to pursue fishing activities in the Pacific under their countries’ 
flag. However, most of the cases relating to IUU fishing involved vessels that have been licensed 
to fish in FFA member countries under the multilateral and bilateral agreements (Edeson et al, 
2001). 
Additionally, other relevant issues of concern are ‘corruption’5 involving the negotiation of 
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access agreements and license by DWFNs (Tsamenyi et al. 2008). Corruption is not IUU but it 
is perceived as a proxy for IUU fishing. For example, fishing companies bribe the responsible 
government minister(s) to either lessen the penalties or forfeit such violating relating to the rules/
regulations. Such practice(s) services in boosting IUU fishing activities to linger. Most PICs 
including FFA, Western Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC)6 and Parties to the 
Nauru Agreement (PNA)7 are very fretful about IUU fishing activities as it can cause extinction 
precipitately, if there are no robust measures to deter IUU fishing activities. 
The main issue is the fishers’ lack of ‘compliance’ to fisheries’ regulations. Compliance means 
‘conforming to generally accepted practices or standards’; or ‘the act of obeying, dutiful or 
submissive behaviour to another person or the authority (Oxford mini English Dictionary, 2009, 
p.109).Therefore, compliance in this context refers to commercial fishers obeying fisheries’ and 
boundary regulations set in the Solomon Islands’ Fisheries’ ACT 1998.
Should the issue of ‘compliance’ not be addressed, a negative downturn shall be faced as tuna 
is a major natural resource. Extinction of tuna will distress the social, economic security and 
harmony of small island states (Hanich, 2013).
OVERVIEW OF SOLOMON ISLANDS (SI): COMPLIANCE AND REGULATIONS
Despite putting in place numerous laws and management policies by the PICs’ governments, 
non-compliance in the form of IUU fishing activities continues in the region. 
Fascinatingly, DWFNs have had higher incidences of violating regulations in contrast to locally 
based industrial fishers (Island Sun, 2010; Lilomo, 2012; SIG Audit Report, 2012) which is quite 
apprehensive given that the mainstream fishers operational in the Western Central Pacific Ocean 
(WCPO) are the DWFNs. In the Solomon Islands, only eight (8) fishing boats are locally based 
while two hundred and seventy six (276) are DWFNs’ vessels from Taiwan, Korea, Japan, EU 
and USA (Fisheries Officer, personal communication, January 3, 2012). According to Tsemenyi 
et al. (2008), tuna caught by DWFN through IUU and corrupt practices have cost the Solomon 
Islands’ economy 5 million US dollars in 2005. 
There was an upsurge in IUU fishing activities over the last three years. A report conceded by 
the office of the Auditor General stated twenty six (26) cases to be reported and investigated 
between 2009 and 2011 (Lilomo, 2012). Most fishers that were arrested were DWFNs (Island 
Sun 2010).
Solomon Islands face lots of flaws linking to non-compliance issues. First,   it has a very large 
ocean, approximately 1,340,000 square kilometres (km), which marks the high level of strain in 
carrying out effective surveillance and monitoring. This is also compounded by the high cost, 
lack of adequate manpower and patrol vessels (Department of Marine Fisheries nd; Officer 
number 1, personal communication, December 20, 2012 ). Also, contributing further is  the weak 
governance and institutional problems (Sasako 2012). 
Besides, the national government is also finding it difficult to implement its policies against 
DWFNs because most of them are major development partners of the Solomon  islands. For 
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illustration, Taiwan is a significant development partner to the Solomon islands  government; 
nonetheless most of their vessels are the ones that recurrently violate the rules (SIG Auditors’ 
Report, 2012). The national government finds it challenging to apply the full strength of the laws 
because they fear possible repercussions from the Taiwanese’ government. 
Moreover, these types of rules also play a noteworthy part in determining compliance. Rules that 
act as pre-conditions for fishers to benefit economically were found to be easy to follow. For 
example, the rule that requires fishers to take on board observers before they could go out for 
fishing is relatively easy for purse seiners to obey. In contrast, fishers found rules that restrict 
them from maximising their gains illegally problematic to follow. For example, reportage of 
catch is a difficult rule. This is because fishers misreport or not report at all to procure economic 
gain. Another example is fishing in territorial waters. Some fishers intrude into forbidden areas 
to set their nets whenever they find concentrated schools of tuna. This gives them economic 
advantage (Officer number 1, personal communication, December 20, 2012).  
Also, some fishing gear8 do not meet conditions set by the rules . The most obvious one is ‘purse 
seining’. Purse seining is a destructive fishing method because it does not select the size and 
types of fish. It kill undersized tuna9and by-catches10 indiscriminately. This poses serious threat 
to the tuna stock because killing undersized fish  will deplete the stock; similarly catching by-
catches affects the tuna food chain (Officer number 9, personal communication, January 5th, 
2012). 
Getting all the fishers to comply with the regulations is difficult. Based on the theories of 
Ostrom et al. (1994) and Xepapadea (2003), fishers realis ed it is difficult to achieve ‘complete 
compliance’. Authorities can only deter IUU but will not completely eradicate it. This is because 
it is demanding to resist people who are subjective to their ‘self-interest’. 
Additionally, some interviewees claimed that fishers always operate a step ahead of enforcers 
. Even if PICs and Regional Bodies such as FFA and PNA collectively try to come up with 
measures to stop IUU fishing, fishers will still find their way to abuse  the system by exploiting the 
weak link. Hence, regulators and enforcers should not view fishers as merely passive recipients 
of rules, but as active opponents who scan their external environments and exploit the available 
opportunities. A typical example is the electronic device – Vessel Monitoring System (VMS). 
Whilst, such technology is very effective in monitoring the fishers’ position, it could not detect 
their activities. Fishers exploit this weakness by engaging in ‘misreporting’ and ‘not reporting 
their catch’ (FFA monitoring officer number 2, personal communication, December 20th, 2013). 
Fishers no longer commit explicit IUU activities. 
The government and FFA must be warned that fishers could still come up with new ideas to 
commit IUU fishing secretly. Fishers depend on the tuna for economic survival. The island 
states therefore, need to continuously scan the situation and with the help of regional organi 
sations and universities engage in continuous research on this issue. 
Interest on this issue becomes stronger when latest journal revealed that less research has been 
conducted  on compliance and regulations (Sunderstrom, 2012). The few studies carried out were 
done in Europe, the Americas, Africa and Asia.
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This paper seeks to test the following objectives:
1. To identify why fishers break rules?
2. To describe circumstances in which they break rules. 
3. To identify when compliance is effective. 
THEORETICAL CONTEXT TO FISHERIES COMPLIANCE
It was argued that long-term sustainable management  of tuna fisheries will not be achieved 
if IUU fishing is not addressed effectively (FAO, 2014). However, the policies and measures 
needed to address this problem depend on the knowledge of the various factors that causes non-
compliance. 
Existing studies have revealed fifteen conditions that influenced fishers’ level of compliance 
to fisheries  regulations (Ostrom et al . 1994: Kuperan et al. 1995; Spalding & Sibert 1997; 
Gunningham & Grabosky 1998; Honneland 2000; Hatcher 2000; Xepapadea 2003; Jenny et 
al. 2006; Abusin & Hassan, 2009; Alayon, 2011). To help understand, these conditions were 
broken down to three main categories: (1) Conditions that influence fishers to break the rules (2) 
Conditions that influence fishers to obey them, and (3) Biological & Social factors.
1. CONDITIONS THAT INFLUENCE FISHERS TO BREAK THE RULES
Review of existing literatures has categorised six main conditions why fishers break rules. They 
are as follows:
1. Economic Gain (Ostrom et al., 1994; Kuperan et al., 1995; Hatcher, 2000; Xepapadea, 
2003; Jenny et al., 2006; Abusin &  Hassan, 2009; Alayon, 2011). Most fishers break rules 
for economic benefits, which are mostly motivated by business and personal interests. Their 
decision to break them often arises when they know that the gain far exceeds the costs; 
2. Lack of Knowledge of the Rules (Alayon, 2011). Fishers break rules if they have insufficient 
knowledge of the rules and if they misunderstand them; 
3. (3) Border Issue (Honneland, 2000). Rules can be broken if the national border between 
two neighbouring countries is disputed (ibid); For example, the dispute between Fiji and 
Tonga over Minerva Island has forced either party to go and fish on that Island (Field, 
2011); 
4. Common Pool Resources (CPRs) (Ostrom et al., 1994). The fact the ‘commons’ are non-
excludable and no one owns them, make it easier for fishers to violate the rules; 
5. Fish Behaviour. Tuna does not know about the boundaries or the rules. They move and 
migrate according to environmental and psychological conditions (Spalding & Sibert 1997). 
Fishers often break the rules when they cite schools of tuna concentrated in forbidden 
territories or less than 7 miles off land. Sometimes, they pursue them to other EEZ and set 
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their nets, particularly if enforcers and observers are not present; and 
6. Regulators’ Behaviour. Regulators make rules and amend legislation to further strengthen 
tuna management; but most of the time they behave controversially. Such behaviour 
encourages non-compliance (Gunningham & Grabosky 1998). 
2. CONDITIONS THAT INFLUENCE FISHERS TO OBEY THEM
These conditions are further broken down into two main groups namely, voluntary and non-
voluntary. Voluntary compliance is where fishers willingly cooperate with the rules. There are 
seven factors under this category. These are; (1) moral behaviour and personal development 
(Alayon 2011; Gezelius 2008; Honneland 2000; Jenny et al. 2006; Kuperan et al. 1995). Some 
fishers value obeying rules as important, this is influenced by their personal development; (2) 
social norms (Ostrom et al. 1994; Honneland 2000; Jenny et al. 2006; Eggart and Lokins 2008; 
Gezelius 2008;).The overall ‘perception of others’ or ‘how others think of them’ also has a 
strong influence on fishers’ obedience to rule. Fishers do not want to be seen negatively by the 
community. Thus, if majority of the fishers follow rules, the others will do the same (ibid); (3) 
nationality (Gezelius 2008: Havice `& Campling 2010). Some societies practice and emphasise 
strong moral values. The Norwegian communities for example are very high law abiding people. 
This influences their attitudes towards compliance (Gazelles, 2008); (4) legitimacy of rules 
(Kuperan et al., 1995; Jenny et al., 2006; Eggart & Lokina, 2008; Alayon, 2011). The authors 
argued that fishers voluntarily obey the rules if they perceive them as fair (ibid); (5) sense of 
belonging (Alayon, 2011). It was argued that local people obey rules more than foreigners. 
Existing research mentioned that local fishers  tend to take ownership of the resources and 
ensure that the resources benefit their communities and the future generation. However, the 
foreigners are more focused on their immediate personal gains (ibid); (6) community work (co-
management). Studies indicate that fishers voluntarily comply with rules when they are involved 
in the management of the resources (Hatcher et al., 2000; Gezelius 2008;). This also includes 
asking  for stakeholders’ input in formulating policies (Hatcher, 2000; Havice & Campling, 
2010). This suggests, fishers may break rules if they are not consulted during the formulation of 
rules. Another reason why fishers break rules under this condition is that  they misunderstand the 
rules. However, sometimes fishers intentionally break the rules even if they understand them to 
express their disagreement; and (7) communication; communication helps improve compliance 
but it does not totally achieve 100% compliance (Ostrom et al., 1994).
Non-voluntary  compliance on the other hand refers to obedience to rules by force (Punitive). 
The ‘Bureaucratic Model’ of management sets rules, policies and procedures, and puts in place 
enforcements and penalties to ensure the rules are followed (Hughes, 2003). Fishers obey rules 
because they fear being punished. This is also known as a ‘coercive approach’. There are two 
main conditions that could force fishers to obey rules. These are (1) enforcement (Kuperan et 
al., 1995; Honneland, 2000; Eggart & Lokina, 2008; Gezelius, 2008; Abusin & Hassan 2009; 
Alayon, 2011; Sasako, 2012). Most fishers tend to obey rules when there is a strong  presence 
of enforcement. However, their level of compliance is weak when enforcement is low (ibid); 
(2.a) penalties (Kuperan et al., 1998; Eggart & Lokins, 2008). It was argued that high penalty 
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scares off fishers; (2.b) graduate sanctions (Ostrom 1994). Graduate Sanctions appear to be very 
successful in achieving compliance in a community set up. Ostrom through an experiment, found 
that fishers tend to obey rules when they are punished gradually (ibid). This is in accordance to 
the nature of the rules broken  the nature of the rules broken. For example, if a fisher breaks one 
simple rule, he will be warned verbally. If he breaks the rule again, a harsher punishment shall be 
imposed. And if he breaks it for the third time, he will be expelled.
3. BIOLOGICAL AND SOCIAL FACTORS
This includes (1) biological reasons (Ostrom et al., 1994; Homeland, 2000; Gezelius, 2008). 
Fishers obey rules if they know that the fish are juvenile. This is to allow time for them to grow. 
But they break the rules again when the fish are big (ibid) 
 (2) socio-economic attributes (Abusin & Hassan, 2009). Those who have attended secondary 
education and above comply with rules better compared to those who have less education, and 
those who are well-off obey rules more than those who are marginal (Abusin & Hassan, 2009). 
This could also be associated with self-interest (economic gain), in the sense, that those who are 
economically well-off or have other alternative sources of income,, do not break rules compared 
to those who only depend on fishing.
THEORIES AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
Two interesting theories drawn from existing studies that set a base for ‘compliance’ are from 
Ostrom (1990) and Xepapadea (2003). Ostrom (1990) argued that it is difficult to achieve 100% 
compliance because self-seeking 11fishers would break rules even if the majority comply. This 
theory was further complemented by Xepapadea (2003) with his theory of co-operative and 
non-cooperative rules. It argues that there are two rules in existence for harvesting of fisheries 
resources; one that involve obeying rules and the other that violate them. He maintains that these 
two rules have to co-exist to maintain equilibrium. If the two forces are not balanced, they will 
naturally stabilise themselves. This makes it difficult to achieve total compliance. 
However, the ‘tragedy of the commons’, Ostrom (1990), stressed that fishers acting on ‘self-
interest’ will be worse off in the long run. Overfishing based on self-interest leads to extinction 
of the stocks.  This paper tries to understand fishers’ behaviour as a first step in integrating these 
three variables amicably. 
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METHODOLOGY
This ‘field study’ was conducted  with a ‘qualitative’ methodology. Information was gathered 
through personal interviews and focus groups. 
The research was conducted in Honiara and Noro where offloading and transhipment of fish 
were done. Selection  of informants was :   through non-random sampling using a mixture of 
stratified, accidental and snowball sampling. Methods were conducted mostly through  the 
intercept method.
Emails were also used to gather information from experts that were located in another country and 
to refer back to officers who had  been interviewed earlier in the Solomon Islands to reconfirm 
certain information. 
Secondary sources such as reports, newspapers, online and archival information were used to 
complement primary findings and to give figures and other relevant facts useful for this paper. 
FINIDNGS AND ANALYSIS
WHY FISHERS BREAK RULES?
Violating fisheries’ rules is a criminal activity predominantly driven by economic goals, self-
interests and greed. Fishers break most of the rules secretly, when they know their chance of 
getting caught is low. This results  in maximis ing their profits12. Simultaneously, they make extra 
money through bonuses from their employers. The size of the bonus depends on the volume of 
the catch; i.e. the higher the catch volume the greater the bonus (Enforcement Officer number 1, 
personal communication, December 1st, 2012  ). 
One of the senior monitoring officers  working for Forum Fisheries Agencies (FFA) mentioned; 
‘vessels involved in IUU because they want more money. Their payments depend on their catch 
(FFA Monitoring Officer number 2, personal communication, December 22nd, 2012). 
Another current fisherman, an engineer of one of the purse seiners mentioned; ‘the main reasons 
for illegal fishing is to make money. You can break rules for emergency reasons and to save life, 
but the rest is to make money’ (. Fisherman number one, personal communication, December 
22nd, 2013) 
However, with the introduction of advanced technologies in monitoring and surveillance 
activities, fishers also do not commit clear cut IUU fishing. Instead , they do it secretly in ways 
that are difficult to detect. Example, misreporting, tampering of VMS and setting fishing nets 
when transiting through other exclusive zones within FFA member countries (FFA Monitoring 
Officer number 2, December 22nd, 2013).
Secondly, on a micro-level, fishers break rules such as catching undersize d tuna, shark  fining 
and so on for personal gain (money and material goods). Fishers catch undersized tuna and other 
because they intend to  sell them for extra cash.other times they exchange fish for material goods 
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such as cigarettes, vegetables, crops and fruits. 
Thirdly, there are other non-commercially driven reasons for breaking rules. Some of them are 
throwing of plastics and other non-biodegradable items overboard, discharging bilge and waste 
water, and failure to paste fishing license at the wheel house ( Observer Programme Coordinator 
number 2, personal communication, January 6, 2013   Fishers and enforcers may not see breaking 
these rules as serious. Furthermore,  violating them also reduces the tuna population. Some of the 
reasons fishers may break these rules are ignorance, negligence and laziness.
Fishers may also break them because of lack of knowledge or awareness of their actions. 
Similarly, enforcers may not emphasi se these rules enough as they do with those that try to 
restrict maximisation of profits through illegal  means. 
Whilst island  s tate s may not put strong emphasis on countering such violations, it is becoming 
a concern because rules broken through ignorance and negligence are widely committed by 
most fishers in general. Also, the rate at which they are committed is increasing. Spalding and 
Sibert (1997) argued that tuna preferred a clean and pollution free environment. If they sense the 
environment is polluted, they move or migrate to other cleaner environment s. 
Fourthly, fishers break rules to fulfil l social obligations. Most families, relatives and friends of 
fishers expect them to bring some fish home. Fishers often feel obliged to respond positively 
to such requests. They mostly fulfill such expectations by catching undersize d tuna. Families 
and relatives are important backbone  for fishers.  Most of them work as fishermen to help and 
support their families and relatives. Catching undersize d tuna to take home to families and 
relatives is an example of this bond. Sometimes fishers deliver trays full of fish to villages for 
church festivals, feastings and other important occasions. This is a common practice  by locally 
based vessels. 
CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH FISHERS BREAK RULES
There are three main conditions that determine the level of compliance; these are motives , 
‘enforcement’ and ‘community’ conditions. Motives are the factors that drive fishers to break 
rules. The findings revealed that the conditions that influence fishers to break rules are (1) Self- 
Interest (2) Social Obligation and (3) Misunderstanding of Rules. Self-interest is predominantly 
monetary pursuance. There are six attributes that are related to ‘self-interest’. These are (i) 
Economic Gain (profit maximisation) (ii) Personal Gain (income and material goods) (iii) 
Nationality13 (iv) Fishing Gear 14and (v) Un-licensed Vessels15. The general perception is that 
‘fishers’ motives’ are economically driven. 
Punitive, on the other hand, are the mechanisms put in place under the ‘bureaucratic management 
model’ to deter violation of rules. However, it was revealed that ‘punitive’ conditions are 
weak and ineffective. This makes ‘non-compliance’ difficult to extinguish. One of the main 
components of ‘punitive’ is ‘enforcement’. Enforcement is weak because the  Pacific class patrol 
boats that are mandated to enforce rules are inadequate. Moreover, the sea boundary is too big 
for two assets to monitor effectively. Furthermore, inadequate financial resource does not allow 
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these assets to patrol regularly  . Another limitation is lack of fuel depot to refuel patrol vessels 
that monitor the eastern region.
Other areas that have contributed to weak enforcement are the limitation of the VMS and the 
forgiving attitudes of fisheries  officers. While the VMS has strengthened monitoring and 
surveillance activities, it could not detect specific IUU activities such as misreporting and no 
reporting. This left a gap , allowing fishers to exploit. Moreover, the fact that  fisheries’ observers 
are so forgiving and helpful to violators encourages such activities to continue.
In contrast, the Fisheries’ Observers program me that was previously criticis ed for suspected 
‘informal activities’16 has improved. The current system is designed in such a way that ‘informal 
behaviour’ can be easily identified from the data. The coordinators interviewed confirmed that 
the data collected so far has revealed absence of such behaviour. However, the 5% observers17’ 
coverage in the long liners and pole and line is still a concern. This is because fishers can still 
engage in IUU fishing in those vessels that do not have observers on board.
The second factor that has contributed to the weak enforcement is, the less severity of ‘penalty’. 
The penalties imposed by the government appeared to be low18. This does not help deter potential 
violators. Also, there were existing penalties that were further reduced out of court.
The third factor is ‘political influence’. There are instances where enforcements have been 
undermined by both political and public administrative interventions. This concerns situations 
where violators have been arrested and escorted for further investigations at the patrol boat base but 
political leaders and senior bureaucrats intervened. This discourages and weakens enforcements. 
One of the reasons for this is the strong diplomatic ties between Solomon Islands and some of 
the DWFNs’ governments. A typical example of this is Solomon Islands and Taiwan. Another 
reason is the way in which Fisheries’ Ministers go to sign fishing access agreement with overseas 
countries. Due to the ‘red carpet’ treatment they received the Minister agreed with terms that 
were not specified in the licenc e conditions
The community attributes namely ‘positive norms’ and ‘communications’ have never been 
practised. There has never been a standard positive norm practised in the tuna industry. Fishers 
seem to behave independently trying to fulfill  their own interests. Similarly, there is no such 
practi ce as stock is updated from  responsible authorities in the form of pamphlets, reports, 
brochures, awareness . The community model has never  been  practised. 
The other two factors under this model are ‘community work’ and ‘legitimacy of rules’. The 
findings revealed DWFNs have not actively taking part in formulation of rules .nor have they 
been  actively involved in surveillance activities. Despite, most fishers perceiving the rules as 
fair, it does not stop them from breaking them. 
WHEN COMPLIANCE IS EFFECTIVE?
Fishers obey rules either involuntarily (by force) or voluntarily. The findings revealed that fishers 
obey rules involuntarily because they fear getting into trouble. Fishers have families who depend 
on them for financial support. Hence, they fear termination  from their job if they violate rules. 
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Also, they mentioned that the presence of observers makes it difficult to violate rules nowadays. 
Also, the technology currently used such as the VMS makes it quite difficult to commit IUU 
activities. 
In contrast, factors that influence fishers to voluntarily comply vary. One of them is their long 
term interests. Fishers voluntarily avoid catching undersize d tuna so that they could be fit for 
sale . This is for  their best interest.
Secondly, there are other fishers who have high moral values. This makes them believe that 
violating the rule  is wrong. Such beliefs are influenced by their personal development.
Thirdly, some local fishing masters obey rules because of their strong sense of belongingness. 
They care more about the rules , claiming they belong  to their country. This helps them take 
ownership of the rules. 
Lastly, other fishers obey rules because they sympathise with t he fish. They perceive  that the 
fish also wants to live; hence they see no reasons to capture and kill them if they are not required 
by the buyers or for canning.
Rules that fishers find difficult to follow are classified under three categories; those that are 
related to ‘economic interests’, ‘negligence’ and the type of ‘gear’ used. Rules that have economic 
interests are; - catch retention19, casting nets on whale sharks, casting nets 7 miles off shores, 
and misreporting of catch. Fishers experienced difficulties in complying with them because this 
would restrict them from earning extra income.
However, there are other rules fishers found difficult to follow because of negligence, ignorance, 
or laziness. These rules are, failure to display license at the wheel house, throwing of rubbish 
(plastics), discharging of oil, and misreporting. Misreporting also falls into this category because 
sometimes fishers just fail to accurately report catch such as the by-catches due to negligence.
The other reason fishers may find it hard to comply is due to  the type of gear used. Purse seining 
and long linings frequently breach the rules that forbid  catching and killing species of special 
interest such as ‘turtles’, ‘whale sharks’, ‘dolphins’, ‘other fish, and ‘undersize tuna’ . Often the 
types of gear used such as purse seining20makes it difficult to save the untargeted species.
CONCLUSION 
When looking at the reasons why fishers break fisheries  rules and relating them to the 3 
objectives, it is clear that ‘economic gain’ was the hub of the issue because it has direct link to 
all the objectives. Captains and fishers break rules to maximise their companies’ profits; and 
in return their employers reward them with incentives such as bonus. This encourages such 
practices to continue. 
There are other environmentally harmful habits that were practised by fishers although  these 
are non-IUU related. One of them is sea pollutions21. Most fishers throw plastics and other 
harmful liquid substances such as bilge, brine and so on into the sea out of ignorance and lack of 
knowledge of their impacts.
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The weak enforcement together with low penalties imposed by the government make it difficult 
to deter ‘non-compliance’. These are caused by lack of resources, manpower, capacity and 
advanced surveillance technologies. 
However, this research revealed that biological reasons, sympathising with the fish, moral value 
and sense of belonging could help achieve ‘voluntary compliance’. The lack of sufficient resources 
to effectively implement a ‘coercive approach, requires the government and stakeholders to 
consider increasing the level of ‘voluntary compliance’. This should be adopted into their tuna 
fisheries management policies.
ENDNOTES
1 Distance Water Fishing Nations (DWFNs) are fishers from other countries that have sought access to fish for tuna in the 
Solomon Islands’ or other Pacific Islands countries’ 200 miles exclusive economic zones (EEZ). DWFNs vessels that are 
currently fishing in Solomon Islands waters are Taiwan, Japan, European Union and the United States.
2 Bilateral Agreement refers to fishing agreement between Distance Water Fishing Nations and a particular Pacific Island 
country.
3 Multilateral Agreement regulates conditions signed between a DWFN and the Forum Fisheries Agency’ on behalf of its 
member countries.
4  The Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA) based in Honiara, consists of 17 South Pacific Islands countries namely, Australia, 
Cook Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Palau, Papua New 
Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tokelau, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu. Its objective is to strengthen national capacity 
and regional solidarity in ensuring member countries manage their fisheries resources that falls within their 200 mile 
exclusive economic zone. 
5  Corruption is the abuse of position of trust by regulators and fisheries’ enforcers to gain unfair advantage.
6 The Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC) was established by the ‘Convention for the Conservation 
and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks’ in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean (WCPF Convention). This 
body manages tuna in the high seas. It has 32 member countries which include all sovereign PICs, participating 
territories, colonial ruler and DWFNs. It also has 12 non-members which comprise other emerging DWFNs. 
7  Parties to the Nauru Agreement (PNA) is a sub-regional group consisting of eight FFA member countries; Papua 
New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Kiribati, Tuvalu, Palau, Federated States of Micronesia, Marshall Islands and Nauru. These 
eight countries control 25% of the world’s tuna supply. They established sub-regional agreements on the terms and 
conditions of purse seiners’ licenses. Also it brings together these eight countries to sustainably manage their tuna and 
to increase their benefits.
8  Fishing gears refers to the equipment used for catching tuna. In this context fishing gears refers to pole and line, purse 
seining and long linings. 
9  Undersize tuna referred to tunas below 1 kilogram.. These sizes are rejected by buyers (importers) or canneries.
10 By-catch is marine creatures that have little commercial value but are often caught and killed in the nets. This includes 
dolphins, turtles, seabirds, sharks, juvenile fish and other fish that are not targeted in the tuna operations.
11  Self-seeking fishers are those who only concern about maximising their profit.
12  This is the profit made by the fishing company.
13  Nationality – fishers from certain countries such as Taiwan have a poor record of complying with the rules. They are 
mostly driven by ‘self-interest’ for economic benefit.
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14  Fishing Gear – using ‘purse seining’ for fishing. This method is destructive as it does not select the size and type of fish 
(including by-catches). Anything that is trapped in the net is killed. Selection of fishing gear is influenced by economic 
gain.
15  Unlicensed Vessels – although vessels know that they do not have the license to fish in some EEZ, this is motivated by 
‘economic benefit’.
16  Informal activities is a more respectable way for describing ‘corruption’ the way in which observers are bribed to allow 
fishers to violate rules such as under reporting, FAD fishing, fishing without license etc without reporting them. 
17  The 5% observers’ coverage in the long liners and pole and lines means some of the vessels do not necessarily need 
to have observers.  
18  Low penalties do not deter fishers because the benefits would outweigh the costs encouraging fishers to continue 
with IUU.
19 Fishers must not dispose any fish caught dead into the sea even if they are dead. They have to take them ashore. Fishers 
do not like this because it restricts the storage capacity for the targeted size (species). 
20 Purse seining is a fishing method that uses fishing nets to capture the tuna.  Such fishing technique does not select the 
fish and often captures anything that is trapped in the net. Furthermore, it is difficult to save most of the species that 
are entangled in the net. Most of them die as a result. 
21 Pollution which includes throwing plastics and other non-bio gradable items overboard. 
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